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ABSTRACT. Expertise suffers booms and troughs like any other market 
good. The supply and demand for specialists, and the nature of the 
specialisms required, change in accordance with the exigencies of time and 
place. A particular breed of specialists is on the ascendant as a number of 
countries seek to confront, accept or adapt to the massive body of 
obligations of European Union (EU) law (referred to as the acquis 
communautaire) in the context of accession negotiations. In the dozen 
applicant states, a typically very small number of specialists in such matters 
is suddenly sought after as government consultants, media commentators, 
technical reporters and impact assessors. This article adopts a political 
sociology perspective in seeking to assess the influence of such technical 
experts on the politics of national industrial relations. It argues that such 
experts do somehow infect the opinions of interest groups, as well as their 
policy with respect to the EU in particular. Such is more likely to be the case 
when such interest groups suffer from a 'knowledge gap' and do not enjoy 
the services of professional EU speCialists 'in-house'. Primary data are drawn 
mainly from autobiographical material; but the article attempts to propel a 
cross-national debate on the relevance of the experience and its analysis. 
Introduction 
For most, it was already a foregone conclusion. When, in autumn 2000, 
a team of 'three wise men' was engaged by the European Commission to 
examine the human rights record of Austria's political establishment, and 
particularly the behaviour of its ruling coalition, it was clear that a neat 
solution had been found to end Austria's political isolation in western 
Europe, stop the increasing resentment against the ED among Austrian 
citizens, and thus save the ED from further embarrassment. Irrespective 
of the details of a much publicized case, this was yet another example of 
the often unclear dynamics between expertise and political incumbents in 
I 0959-6801 [2001/07)7:2;137-152;018390 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 7(2) 
crafting policy at a European level. On this particular occasion, experts 
had been deployed to legitimize aU-turn in political strategy. Thus, the 
experts, in fewer than 1000 words, provided the objective and indepen-
dent assessment to corroborate and recommend a particular course of 
political action, which (not coincidentally) was exactly the one being, not 
quite silently, contemplated. 
This Article 
This article explores a similar tension between experts and political actors 
in relation to the sphere of industrial relations. The contention is that 
responsibilities and agendas related to EU affairs, particularly the social 
policy obligations arising from EU membership, are leading to an ascend-
ancy of the unaccountable and 'scientific' expert in European industrial 
relations, certainly at a national level. It becomes, therefore, increasingly 
naive to support a classical model of nationally based industrial relations 
which presupposes the social partners as the key actors. Having the 
characteristics of a supranational and transnational European class, EU 
experts may be influencing the tenet and substance of industrial relations 
much more than we may care to admit. 
This article first documents the manner in which a specific group or 
class of experts assumes authority and legitimacy in dealing with EU 
matters. It next seeks to describe how such a group or class of individuals 
gets to influence the tenor, nature and dynamics of industrial relations on 
a national basis, and with what effects. Lastly, it reviews the impact of 
such 'third-party experts' on European industrial relations generally. 
The EU Newspeak 
Directives, acquis, avis, recommendations, regulations, derogations, tran-
sitional periods, communications, Commission, Council, Parliament, 
qualified majority, Treaty, Maastricht, Brussels, Amsterdam and so on: 
this is a sample from the large collection of terms which easily boggles the 
mind of the novice to European Union (EU) matters, but which must 
become staple fare to anyone venturing to develop some understanding 
of how the EU works. The large mass of literature, case law and other 
material concerning the EU is nothing short of awesome. The acquis com-
munautaire is claimed to be some 80,000 pages long, and growing every 
day. 
There are now a record 13 applicant states which are having to inte-
grate this corpus of regulation and practice into national legislation in the 
process potentially leading to eventual EU accession. 'Social Policy and 
Employment' is the title of one out of the 31 chapters of the EU acquis, 
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and its contents are of direct concern to self-employed, waged or salaried 
workers, employers and their representatives. 
Inspiration 
I am indebted for the inspiration for this article to my emerging status as 
an 'expert' on European social policy in my own small sovereign state, 
Malta. Ever since the re-elected Nationalist government reactivated 
Malta's bid for EU membership in autumn 1998, the country has found 
itself on a roller-coaster of meetings, deadlines, implementations, legal 
drafting, administrative reform, impact assessments and so on, all associ-
ated with Malta's self-appointed obligation to conform to the EU acquis 
by a deadline of 1 January 2003. Meanwhile, most local social, political 
and economic players are engaged in an intensive media campaign to shift 
the electorate either for or against membership, in the run-up to a keenly 
anticipated referendum on EU membership, due late in 2002. Malta thus 
presents itself as the smallest country among the set of 13 'first wave plus 
second wave' applicants, the one with the strongest official opposition to 
EU membership among all applicant states,l as well as one trying to 
undergo the transition to qualify for membership in a fairly short time.2 
A Personal Note 
As a university-based sociologist working in the sphere of labour 
relations education and research, I had taken an obvious interest in EU 
social policy over the years, and had organized a variety of educational 
visits for Maltese trade union leaders in connection with the EU.3 My 
monthly contributions to a local newspaper, focusing largely on labour 
relations issues, increasingly considered EU developments. In spring 
1999, I was genuinely surprised to be invited to sit as one of six national 
'expert core members' of the Malta-EU Steering and Action Committee 
(MEUSAC), the institution now responsible for preparing Malta's nego-
tiating positions with respect to the European Commission and enjoying 
wide public representation, though with one glaring exception.4 In this 
capacity, I have also participated as a member of the Maltese government 
delegation to a couple of acquis screening sessions in Brussels. I have been 
asked to prepare reports for both major trade union organizations on the 
implications of adopting Chapter 13 of the acquis in Malta, and partici-
pated in various popular and academic fora (at the university, road shows, 
on radio and on television) to expound on such matters. 
In autumn 1999, I was invited by the Malta Employers' Association 
(MEA) to carry out a study comparing the EU's social policy, labour law 
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and industrial relations acquis with that in force in Malta, identifying the 
differences and recommending action. I accepted the assignment in a per-
sonal capacity, also because this was the first time that the MEA had 
approached me for any such commission; as a person associated with 
trade unions and with declared labour sympathies, a distancing from and 
by the MEA was to be expected. Yet, it seems that my EU 'expertise' (and 
perhaps the unavailability of any decent local alternative) was enough to 
oblige the MEA to override its apprehensions in my regard and to place 
its trust in my competences. 
My report was fully endorsed by the MEA - to the extent that it was 
published without any changes from the original manuscript (Bal-
dacchino, 2000). The report has now become the official MEA position 
paper for making representations to the Malta government as to where 
Maltese employers stand with respect to the 'social policy' implications 
of eventual EU membership. 
I deliberately concluded my study with a national sample survey of 
employer perceptions, and therefore what I was proposing was couched 
as a natural consequence of fieldwork whose validity and merits could 
hardly be contested. I was, nevertheless, quite overwhelmed by the reac-
tions of the MEA leadership in 'coming round' to the recommendations 
I had tabled. It was this very personal, ongoing experience which obliged 
me to consider the role of 'EU experts' in crafting national industrial 
relations and social policy. This article is, therefore, autobiographical in 
many instances and relies considerably on such 'primary data'. 
The Industrial Relations Setting 
There seems to be a fair degree of consensus on the fact that industrial 
relations concerns the exercise of job regulation and the assertion of some 
kind of security, stability and predictability at the workplace, for the 
mutual benefit of employers, management, employees as well as 'third-
party' stakeholders such as consumers and governments. A focus on such 
a state of, albeit continually reconstituted, 'order' (for example, Strauss et 
aI., 1971: 104) or 'governance' (Streeck, 1998: 15) may, however, jaundice 
any assessment of departures from such a virtuous state (such as any 
struggles on the nature and extent of labour control (Hyman, 1975: 26» 
as dysfunctional, anomalous or infectious. A micro-based analysis which 
focuses on the behavioural and political strategies and counter-strategies 
of labour and management has become a specific strand of industrial 
relations research in recent decades, this being in part a healthy reaction 
to the stultifying functionalism of order-obsessed approaches. Mean-
while, the ambit of the study of job regulation has expanded to take on 
board comparative, transnational and European processes (as the articles 
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in the European Journal of Industrial Relations would attest), apart from 
more specifically national, sectoral or regional developments. 
What is often forgotten in this scholarly literature is that the key players 
of industrial relations are not just the social partners and their representa-
tives. The industrial relations systems paradigm established by Dunlop 
(1958), an almost pure example of the bias of modernity, remains particu-
larly solid. It has only been somewhat challenged lately by pleas to incor-
porate socially marginal groups, such as women and homosexuals 
(Dabscheck, 1995; Piore, 1995), as well as 'end-users', such as customers 
(Bellemare, 2000). Yet, often lurking in the shadow of the theory, there 
exists a motley entourage of 'free-floating intellectuals' (Dahrendorf, 1964: 
225, after Weber) to whom industrial relations is also their business, 
though in a markedly different sense. Indeed, the actual regulation of work 
may be significantly determined by authoritative personnel who may have 
no direct stake in the outcome of their counsel. Far removed from the 
'contested terrain' of the workplace, key decisions and positions may be 
taken in the offices of consultancy firms, in the corridors of law courts, or 
in the academic offices of universities. Such 'outsiders' (Perlman, 1928), 
members of the intelligentsia, 'have the capacity to speak (uneasily) for 
others' (Frow, 1995: 164). In such deliberations, whether enterprise 
(micro-) based or nation (macro-) oriented, an analysis of the role of 
'experts' has been surprisingly, and I would add uncomfortably, absent. 
There is definitely room for unease here, and it is the intention of this 
article to start to 'unpack' the reasons for such discomfort. On the agenda, 
therefore, and in agreement with Bellemare (2000: 384-5) is the prob-
lematization of the notion of the 'actor' in industrial relations. 
Defining the Experts 
By 'experts' I mean individuals who are not directly involved in industrial 
relations (they are not representatives of labour, nor of capital, often not 
even of the state), but who, nevertheless, playa very important role in sug-
gesting, even determining, the actual unfolding of industrial relations 
between any combination of these three groups. They obtain and use their 
influence by virtue of the combination of knowledge, skill qualification, 
experience and track record in industrial relations and related areas - a 
portfolio which renders them and their advice naturally acceptable to one 
or more of the social partners. Like the older professions (archetypically, 
medicine, law and theology), and like the new middle class to which they 
typically belong, the market capacity of most of these experts is almost 
totally dependent on claims to 'esoteric knowledge', alias technical or 
intellectual expertise (Milner, 1999: 157). Such individuals can wield dis-
proportionate power: they are not generally accountable to a constituency 
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and are, therefore, not obliged to expose themselves to public or member-
ship scrutiny; their expertise can provide them with a special legitimacy 
and a positional advantage in any argument in which they are deemed to 
be versed; they can, and do, with tact and diplomacy, exert a significant 
influence on policy- and decision-making. Much like dei ex machina, their 
exclusion from industrial relations scrutiny and analysis may only help to 
augment their power and almost to mystify their role. The outcome of bar-
gaining rounds, the handling of an impasse, the interpretation of an award 
- so much can depend on such 'significant others'. Conversely put, the 
leverage and bargaining power of a social partner may depend consider-
ably on the wisdom and shrewdness of its team of experts. The trade union 
leader, the general manager, the labour director, these may be merely the 
front line of a human resource machinery which is obliged to depend much 
more on its concealed professional cadres than one would care to admit. 
Such an uneasy dependence is likely to increase with an expanding corpus 
of knowledge, laws, regulations, case law, administrative procedures and 
other provisions governing industrial relations. A potentially disabling 
process of professionalization (Illich, 1977)? 
Who are these individuals? They include: (a) lawyers versed in labour 
law, who must habitually defend their clients or press their case in court, 
tribunal or labour commission hearings and sittings, all the more so in 
cultures and environments which thrive on litigation; (b) partners in 
accountancy firms, industrial relations and human resources consultants 
who advise their clients on strategic and tactical issues; (c) influential and 
charismatic labour officials from state departments, state ministers and 
other seasoned arbitrators, conciliators and mediators who develop a 
working relationship with the social partners; (d) industrial relations aca-
demics and scholars who may actively involve themselves, or else be 
called upon to support the planning and policy-setting mechanisms of 
one or more of the same social partners; and (e) researchers and other 
enterprising individuals who may have a specialization in a particularly 
relevant field of study. Of course, such identities may overlap or come 
together in one and the same person. 
This approach to industrial relations processes draws obvious paral-
lelisms with elitist political theory. There is the same toning down of the 
discretion often assumed to lie at the hands of elected political actors and 
their fora; there is a sinister recognition that certain groups, or classes, of 
actors have an ingrained endurance and a position of power from which 
they are not likely to be easily dislodged, even in the wake of the 'chang-
ing of the guard' normal of democratic politics; there is a fatalistic under-
standing that such resilient actors have the ability to distort and shape 
both agendas and outcomes, in order to preserve and advance their own 
distinct interests. Unlike Plato's guardians, Veblen's technocrats and 
Mannheim's intellectuals, such EU experts may be gifted, but are not 
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necessarily selfless people. As market players, experts have a material 
interest in the virtues of scarcity; as opinion formers, they may have a 
prowess in manipulation (Lasswell, 1911). 
The Evolution of Experts 
Experts have been defined as depositories of 'effortfully acquired abili-
ties' (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 1993: 3). They tend to come and go, 
accompanying waves of specialization and discovery, and they tend to 
disappear (not without some last-ditch, desperate, rearguard action) into 
the background when their competencies become popularized and depro-
fessionalized or otherwise lose their relevance and glamour. Experts exer-
cise market power and political influence in inverse ratio to the number 
of their cadre and in direct proportion to the novelty, scope and duration 
of the demand for their 'core competence' from the wider society.5 They 
may exercise deliberate closure tactics to restrict access to that intellectual 
capital which is the source of their privilege (Murphy, 1986). 
The EU has its own impressive discourse and thus requires its own 
compendium of literacy and operacy skills. Laffan (1997: 12) refers to 
such a discourse as part of the symbolism necessary to create that 'imag-
ined community' which is the invention of 'Europe'. This unique, trans-
national mechanism imposes a powerful obligation for an understanding 
of its internal workings on its members and (at least some of) their citi-
zens: first, in order to conform to legal parameters and minimum stan-
dards; second, in order to tap EU resources and funds; third, in order to 
harmonize administrative practices and procedures; fourth, in order to 
participate fully and proactively in the EU's various decision-making 
structures and thus have a say in determining policy. 
The EU has many of the characteristics of a 'mock bureaucracy' (Blau, 
1968). It functions through highly complex procedures which are not 
only public and official, but also implicit and undeclared. It is also clear 
that an effective relationship with the sophisticated mechanisms of EU 
governance (both in terms of meeting obligations, but perhaps more 
importantly in terms of tapping its vast resources) depends on a famili-
arity with the unwritten rules of the game, or at least an ability to 'learn 
the ropes': how to develop networks and cultivate relationships which 
may potentially and eventually deliver. 
A Heavy Burden 
While citizens at large may profess ignorance and confess bewilderment at 
the panoply of EU-related and EU-dictated detail, practically all collective 
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groupings, such as civil servants, farmers, environmentalists, industrialists, 
traders, customs officers, academics, trade unions, and professional associ-
ations, should (or must?) at least come to terms with the variety of ways in 
which the specific corpus of ED legislation and practice will have an impact 
on their behaviour. It is clearly in their interest to do so. Furthermore, it is 
also in their interest to have effective lobbying mechanisms infiltrating the 
corridors of Brussels and Luxembourg - finding out what is going on, 
reacting quickly to events, establishing a sympathetic ear in a strategic loca-
tion and so on. 
Similar obligations now loom for 12 of the 13 applicant states (the six 
'first wave' Luxembourg summit applicants (1997) and the six 'second 
wave' Helsinki applicants (1999), but excluding Turkey) as they proceed 
with their negotiations with the European Commission on each chapter 
of the acquis with the purpose of achieving eventual accession to the ED. 
What is, however, different from previous enlargement exercises is that 
while applicant states are (generally speaking) the least prepared to take 
the acquis on board (certainly by comparison with the last enlargement 
of 1995), they are, nevertheless, technically expected to conform to an 
acquis which continues to grow ever more awesome. 
Naturally, existing ED Member States have the benefit of advance 
warning and foresight of any new obligations by virtue of their involve-
ment in the (usually lengthy) process which leads eventually to the intro-
duction of the obligation itself. Applicant states, in stark contrast, are by 
definition presented with a fait accompli. This does not only mean that 
the tempo of compliance must be faster, it also means that the generation 
of local expertise to implement any ED-dictated measures and to come to 
terms with how to 'manage' the behemoth (in the dual sense described 
above) must also be faster. The European Commission itself expresses 
concern, at least on an official level, at the probable vacuum of under-
standing and competence by questioning what it calls the 'administrative 
capacity' and level of preparedness of applicant states to conform to their 
eventual obligations in accordance with the given acquis.6 
This creates the scenario which will naturally and quickly spawn 
'experts' - be these real 'heavyweights' or incompetent 'pseuds'. While 
expertise may be easiest to identify 'when it differs most dramatically 
from what ordinary people can do' (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 1993: 6), 
less striking differences may have a surprisingly similar effect. At first, 
anyone with the least advantage may be sought after for information and 
advice, even those who may have been to Brussels on holiday may find 
themselves suddenly respected for the insights on the ED which may have 
presumably emerged from such a 'rare' experience, and these same indi-
viduals may recognize that lucrative spin-offs may be forthcoming if they 
assiduously and intentionally cultivate such a standing. If, as the proverb 
goes, in the land of the blind, the one-eyed is sovereign, then, frankly, 
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there may be no one around to call one's bluff and it is relatively easy for 
any modest or incidental insight to be promoted as, or be mistaken for, 
proper expertise. Such is also more likely to happen in the least populated 
states, as well as those where the standard of education is low (Bal-
dacchino, 1997: 73-6). There is bound to be a rush (by business, pressure 
groups, government and media) to recruit and tap the limited resources 
available with some modicum of European specialism; and another rush 
of individuals who will strategically embark on education, training, in-
service programmes or placements with some EU relevance to position 
themselves among the new category of sought-after experts. 
Such experts may also become quite adept at tapping funding as well 
as the certification of their expertise through regular research contracts 
and invitations from the European Commission itself and associated 
foundations. Once recognized by the Commission, they are even more 
likely to be recognized, and feted with awe and respect, in their own 
country. Do we not espy here the patterns of a virtuous cycle? 
There are various stages of progress towards expertise that one may 
wish to identify, while keeping in mind that not every person will, or will 
be allowed to, or will want to, succeed in making a full transition. The 
point of departure is usually a situation of unconscious incompetence -
when the constituency does not even realise that it lacks a certain exper-
tise. The next stage is that of conscious incompetence: in crude terms, a 
realization of ignorance, a condition which has rapidly come upon the 
citizens, policy-makers, civil servants, business and community leaders in 
the latest dozen EU applicant states, many of which are still coming to 
terms with the radical effects of their recent transition to a market 
economy and a pluralist democracy. The third stage is that of conscious 
competence, where those who have mastered the expertise go about prac-
tising and brandishing it in a self-conscious manner. The fourth and final 
stage is arguably that of unconscious competence, where the experts have 
now mastered their craft and skill so well that they 'perform' naturally, 
without any need for deliberate planning and problem-solving (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus, 1986). What then is the impact of such experts on the 
unfolding of industrial relations in their home territory, if any? 
The Thrust of Trust 
Experts, like true professionals, require considerable autonomy to exer-
cise their skill, even when required to do so in an employment relation-
ship. Experts behave in a manner that assures and assumes that they are 
recognized as responsible for how they work, often even why they work, 
since they command discretion certainly on methodology and often on 
action agendas. The resultant 'service relationship' goes beyond the cash 
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nexus and is thus invested with a considerable measure of 'trust' 
(Goldthorpe, 1982: 162, 170). Such a trust relationship, however, differs 
from the one described by Fox (1974) in labour-management relations. 
We are here referring to a privileged standing which also means that, typi-
cally, the contractor tends to go along with what the expert advises; 
indeed, it is at the point of choosing the expert in the first place (if and 
when such a choice is at all available) that the contractor exercises 
maximum leverage over the eventual service. A very charged, personal-
ized choice tends to be made, the contractor knowing fully well that, once 
the choice is made, she or he has almost a moral obligation to accept, sub-
stantively and conceptually, whatever the 'expert' will then advise. After 
all, expertise is a most idiosyncratic market good: the value of an expert's 
advice is not so easily proved or disproved. The political weight of such 
advice, the extent to which any such expert advice will be propelled 
reverently, swiftly and without adulteration into policy formulation by 
the contracting party, will depend largely on the 'knowledge gap' between 
the contractor and the expert. 
Of course, there are various possible permutations here: the contrac-
tors may think that they are knowledgeable, when in reality they are 
not; or the contractors may really be quite knowledgeable, introducing 
experts only to professionalize and graft some extra credibility and 
legitimacy to an (already adopted?) position; or again, the contractors 
may have some idea of what the subject matter is about, but they have 
come upon such knowledge incidentally or haphazardly through 
secondary sources. In this latter case, the contractors cannot afford the 
time to delve deeply into the subject, and would perhaps be willing to 
accept, not without chagrin, that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. 
They are, therefore, bound to find themselves in a welcoming and agree-
able disposition to their experts' recommendations, particularly if, as 
good experts habitually do, the latter bolster any proposals and 
recommendations with considerable supporting evidence and argu-
ments. 
Experts, from their point of view, also know that their contractors must 
eventually 'own' any recommendations which they put forward. Such 
ownership can take place in different ways: this is ideally an exercise in 
conviction. However, albeit rarely admitted, this may boil down simply 
to a question of trust and blind faith. The dynamics of such a critical 
transmission remain glaringly aloof from scrutiny: the manner in which 
experts, who 'enjoy considerable authority' (Bachrach, 1967: 78), manage 
the translation of their technical competence into unaccountable, politi-
cal power. Where such a transmission is successful, the contractor can be 
relied upon to prove an ardent espouser and ambassador of the expert's 
recommendations. 
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Induced Policy Shifts 
Ardent enough to soften, perhaps even dislodge, hardened positions? 
Ardent enough to cause a substantial, even radical, policy shift in the atti-
tude of the social partner in question? 
Of all the EU's acquis, perhaps Chapter 13 is exceptional precisely in 
its manner of relinquishing overall responsibility for the substance of 
many obligations, by devolving such to agreements struck between the 
representatives of employers and workers. A typical clause in a Chapter 
13 directive leaves ample room for the social partners 'to conclude ... 
agreements [at both national and European levels] adapting andlor com-
plementing the provisions of this agreement in a manner which will take 
account of the specific needs of the social partners concerned' (Clause 
6(3), Directive 97/81). 
This fairly generous provision (known as the Kristoffersen clause) falls 
squarely within the spirit of subsidiarity promulgated by the EU, but it 
is also a consequence of other factors. It takes cognisance of the very 
diverse industrial relations frameworks, cultures and traditions in the 
different Member States; it captures the hesitation of various Member 
States towards allowing Brussels and its bureaucracy to intervene and 
force some standardization over an area which has to date largely escaped 
being considered' of European concern',7 except at the level of pious prin-
ciples.s But, perhaps, most significantly, it reflects the status of the 
Agreement on Social Policy (an annexe to the Treaty of Maastricht, but 
an integral part of the Treaty of Amsterdam) which establishes a pro-
cedure for reaching European-level contractual agreements by the social 
partners which can take the place of legislation. The emergent 'framework 
agreements'9 are a manifestation of an upheld legitimacy for representa-
tives of employers and labour in securing European-level deals. A similar 
legitimacy is recognized at national level. 
My recommendations to the MEA have emphasized the opportunities 
for such bilateral negotiation, and the advantages of securing such deals 
to both trade unions and employer organizations. Indeed, my report con-
cludes with an appeal for such 'social partnership'. Now, bilateralism is 
not a preferred standpoint in Maltese labour relations where nationwide 
issues are concerned: civil society remains weak, and a political system 
dominated by visible personal contacts and exchange sees politicians 
regularly involving themselves in labour relations disputes, with the other 
social actors regularly soliciting their intervention, and thus often shift-
ing the onus for any change and reform onto the political elite. Yet there 
are some clear signals that the MEA will be proceeding to explore the 
national-level bipartism option seriously, and certainly in a specific 
number of areas. 
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Concluding Reflections 
As a self-made and market-recognized expert on EU affairs, I have found 
myself among the ranks of a growing expert class in Malta, as in other EU 
applicant and EU Member States. Many such experts have developed 
close links with Brussels, and their involvement in this area of knowledge 
is likely to have been predicated on a certain sympathy with the Euro-
pean project; otherwise, their attitude towards the EU and its workings 
may have mellowed with their increasing (lucrative?) involvement in EU-
related affairs, and their exchanges with like-minded experts from 
Europe. I am suggesting so because it seems to me that EU experts also 
tend to be largely pro-EU and, therefore, working, at least in the various 
applicant states, primarily in favour of their country assuming EU 
membership status and persevering on the road to European integration. 
Any movement by Maltese trade unions and employers towards 'social 
partnership' would be in effect a move towards convergence with the con-
tinental European social model: 'strong trade unions, wide coverage of 
collective bargaining, an emphasis on employee rights, tripartite regu-
lation and some form ... of representation of employees at company 
level' (Gill and Krieger, 2000: 111-12). Are, therefore, 'EU experts' a 
hitherto unrecognized, homogenizing force in European labour 
relations? 
Has the MEA accepted my counsel? Perhaps. But perhaps not. I may 
be simply deluding myself. I may have merely provided an objective 
crutch to support an emerging policy standpoint of a specific faction of 
the MEA leadership, or even of the influential MEA chief executive. The 
declared impetus for change may quickly subside and fall victim to other, 
urgent considerations. Time will tell. In the meantime, I may hazard to 
identify the following tentative reflections. 
Is there a new European industrial relations at the dawn of the third 
Christian millennium? While national labour relations systems in 
Europe continue to demonstrate unabashed diversity (Ferner and 
Hyman, 1992), there are clear hints towards a convergence of coordi-
nation at a trans-European level. The inroads on European social policy 
in the wake of the Delors Presidency of the EU Commission, the pro-
cedures of the European Employment Strategy, the dominance of left-
of-centre governments in most of the EU Member States during the 
1990s, along with the accession of three corporatist states in 1995, are 
all likely to have contributed to this homogenizing process (Goetschy, 
1999). A new 'logic of labourism' (pace Kerr et aI., 1962) has been sanc-
tioned and legitimized by a core set of EU directives, while one in par-
ticular, that setting up European Works Councils, facilitates the 
transnational exchange and comparison of conditions of employment in 
large transnational firms. The euro will further contribute to such 
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benchmarking when it becomes legal tender as from 2002. 'European 
Industrial Relations' is coming into its own as a specific domain for 
research (Marginson, 2000). 
The growth and consolidation of a trans-European cadre of EU experts 
can be regarded as both an effect and a contributor to any such conver-
gence. Such experts may be advocating the merits of, and facilitating the 
transition or consolidation towards, a revamped form of social corpo-
ratism which has today become, willy-nilly, continental Europe's indus-
trial relations benchmark. 
Does a technical elite get increasingly to influence the political elite, 
particularly in an age dominated by a knowledge-driven economy? Is 
the EU itself a knowledge-driven polity and bureaucracy? If so, is a 
competence in EU Newspeak (Orwell, 1948) not simply a necessary 
condition for effective EU membership, but possibly also a ploy to 
facilitate European integration? Are EU experts serving as the agents of 
another form of 'democratic deficit' in the guise of a standardizing 
Europeanization, that form of institution building which is perhaps the 
single most important difference between the EU and other region-
alisms such as NAFTA or APEC (Sweet Stone and Sandholtz, 1997), 
and if so, are such experts going about this mission deliberately or inad-
vertently? 
In any case, a critical appraisal of the implications of such 'philosopher-
kings' (a possible characterization of politically influential intellectual 
capital) on avowedly democratic institutions (such as trade unions) and 
on the democratic process generally appears timely. If EU public policy 
is embedded in and animated by a politics of expertise, the exposure and 
analysis of such 'nested games' should further fuel the debate on issues of 
democracy, legitimacy, citizenship and accountability, so central to the 
EU project today (Marks et aI., 1996). 
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NOTES 
Maltese politics have been dominated by just two political parties since 
independence in 1964. The Nationalist Party (NP) was returned to power 
with 51.5 percent of the votes at the last national election, in 1998; the Malta 
Labour Party (MLP) secured 48.5 percent. Voter turnout, traditionally very 
high, was approximately 96 percent. 
2 Malta applied for EU membership in 1990. In the years which followed, the 
NP government introduced some measures intended to bring local 
legislation in line with the acquis. The MLP, elected in 1996, froze the 
country's EU application; this was reactivated only after almost two years 
by the re-elected NP government. Malta had enjoyed an association 
agreement with the EU since 1970, but this was never taken further. Clearly, 
the latest 'rush' is somewhat imposed on the incumbent NP government 
which may prefer to secure Malta's entry to the EU before a national 
election becomes due, which is at the latest by the end of 2003. Note that the 
reactivation of Malta's EU membership bid became official in December 
1998. Screening started in spring 1999 and negotiations commenced in 
February 2000. 
3 These included three sets of familiarization visits for Maltese trade unionists 
to Brussels coordinated by the European Commission and an exchange with 
Cypriot trade union leaders. The latter was published as Symeonides and 
Baldacchino (1996). 
4 The Malta Labour Party was invited to send a representative to MEUSAC, 
but refused. Nevertheless, both core group and interest group members on 
MEUSAC come with different political persuasions. 
5 Accountants and auditors, for example, have become institutionalized 
experts in the wake of the regulation and standardization of company 
disclosure practices. Computer programmers, software developers and 
World Wide Web engineers are among the recent wave of experts to cultivate 
a leverage on the world of work and organizational development; they come 
in to fill the void most companies have in computer literacy and operacy, 
which have suddenly become such critical tools for doing business. 
6 Consider the opinion (avis) or annual autumn progress report of the 
European Commission on each applicant state. 
7 Only the 1997 Luxembourg summit formalized a European employment 
strategy, and specific labour relations features (such as wages and salaries, 
the right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lockouts) 
are explicitly and assiduously defended as exclusive responsibilities of 
Member States. 
8 The main initiatives here are the European Social Charter (approved by 11 
EU Member States in 1989, and in turn based on the Council of Europe 
document drafted in 1961) and the framework directives on occupational 
health and safety. 
9 To date, these include those on parental leave (December 1996), part-time 
workers Gune 1997) and workers on fixed-term employment contracts 
Ganuary 1999). 
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